ABSTRACT There are various types of Android apps, such as entertainment apps, health and fitness apps, travel apps, educational apps, business apps, and so on. Android apps can contain business logic, maintain sensitive personal information, and act as a bridge between IoT devices and cloud servers. Since illegal users frequently make a copy of a legitimate Android app and redistribute the plagiarized app for commercial or malicious purposes, many studies have been conducted to detect repackaged/cloned apps and make the Android ecosystem safer. A malicious attacker might apply code obfuscation to avoid app clone detection. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the effects of code obfuscation when detecting cloned apps. In this paper, we design and implement a tool called RomaDroid, which can detect efficiently cloned apps based on features inherent in each app's AndroidManifest.xml file. The manifest file is XML structure defined by tags or attributes and its XML document can be modeled as an ordered labeled tree. The RomaDroid creates a string from the hierarchical tree structure of tags as well as the class name of the components related to intent-filter tags in the manifest file, which are robust to code obfuscation. That is, we create a string from each manifest file of two apps to be compared and measure the similarity between the created two strings with the longest common subsequence (LCS) algorithm. If the measured similarity exceeds a certain threshold, the two apps are determined to be a clone pair (or similar app pair). To validate the RomaDroid, we perform various experiments with both non-obfuscated apps and their obfuscated versions generated by three obfuscation tools. The experimental results show that the RomaDroid detects accurately cloned apps even in the cases code obfuscation has been applied.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the use of smartphones has been rapidly increased, Android has dominated the smartphone market and a wide variety of Android apps have been developed. According to the statistics of Statista, the statistics portal, the number of available apps in the Google Play Store was most recently placed at 2.6 million apps in December 2018. As Android
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apps have become very popular, more users run various types of Android apps such as game apps, business apps, education apps, entertainment apps, travel apps, health and fitness apps, etc. Therefore, mobile apps are becoming more tightly coupled with our everyday life. For example, wearable fitness trackers including Fitbit and MiBand usually sync with users' smartphones, cloud-based servers, or smartwatches to monitor their steps taken, hours slept and other data they might choose to enter and promote their healthy behaviors [48] - [52] . As a bridge between fitness trackers and the cloud server, fitness tracker apps convey sensor data from the trackers to the cloud, track wearers' behaviors, and process potential sensitive data [48] , [49] , [51] .
Recently, the wide use of smartphones promotes the emergence of resource-hungry apps such as speech-or face recognition, augmented reality, intelligent video acceleration, and other new business. These new types of mobile apps put higher tendencies on complexity, energy consumption, and time delay sensitivity, which bring a new paradigm like mobile edge computing (MEC) [53] - [55] . MEC aims at reducing latency by shifting computational efforts from the centralized cloud to the mobile edge. It can reduce the computation latency, provide continuous availability, and allow real-time apps like cloud gaming. As a result, the role of edge-based mobile apps and cloud-augmented mobile apps are becoming more important to business, security, and privacy.
Since a wide range of Android apps has been used and the apps handle highly sensitive data by communicating with IoT devices and cloud servers, Android apps continue to be the main target of attackers. For example, reverse engineering of Android apps is much easier than other mobile platforms and many reverse-engineering tools are available, due to the high level but simple bytecode language used [1] - [3] . As a result, Android apps are easy to be cracked, reused and replicated. Some developers may copy codes from open source apps or libraries but violate the respective license when reusing it in the new context [4] - [6] . In the Android environment, attackers or illegal developers can easily reverse-engineer legitimate apps, clone the code from them, repackage them with ''purpose-added'' features, and re-advertise them in the same or other markets. Gibler et al. [6] reported that 14% of the advertising revenue and 10% of the user base for a developer were diverted to app clones on average. During repacking, some attackers even may insert malicious code into legitimate apps to infect unsuspicious users [3] , [7] , [8] . Zhou and Jiang [8] found 1083 of 1260 (or 86%) malware samples were app clones with malicious payloads. Viennot et al. [9] showed that roughly 25% of Google Play Store app content was duplicative, including various types of spam, app rebranding, and app cloning. As a result, the repackaged apps or cloned apps compromise the copyright of the original authors and may compromise the privacy and security of smartphone users.
Therefore, various techniques have been studied to detect app clones such as techniques based on string [10] , token [11] , [12] , abstract syntax tree (AST) [13] - [15] , or simple hashing [16] , [17] , and also more complicated techniques based on program dependence graphs (PDGs) [18] , [19] or other existing code clone detection methods [7] , [20] including a symbolic-based approach [21] . These existing approaches have the following two key challenges:
• How to achieve accuracy and scalability at the same time in detecting Android app clones. Although the stringbased, token-based, AST-based, and simpler hashing-based approaches are fast, they are typically not as accurate as more complicated approaches such as PDG-based detection [18] , [19] . PDG-based approaches capture the control flow and data dependencies between the code statements inside code fragments, and symbolic-based approach captures semantically equivalent procedures. Although PDG-based and symbolic-based approaches are more accurate, they cannot be scaled to perform app clone detection on a market with over two million apps. For example, it is necessary to avoid graph isomorphism analysis in a graphbased approach such as PDG. As a result, it is still a big challenge to develop an accurate and scalable approach to detect app clones on Android markets [2] , [3] , [7] , [22] .
• How to detect app clones which are transformed with code obfuscation technologies. Some studies [4] , [5] have shown that code cloning may have legal implications such as license violations. A malicious developer may favor hiding his cloning activities and he tries to obfuscate the cloned app to deceive clone detectors. That is, obfuscation is used to hide illegal code reuse and avoid licensing issues [5] , [23] , [27] , [28] , [29] , [34] , [36] . Thus, it is necessary to consider the impact of obfuscated code on the measurements of the Android app cloning. Some studies have been conducted for dealing with obfuscated apps. Signature-based techniques for detecting class cloning, such as Software Bertilonage [24] , [25] , are sensitive to obfuscation, mainly to transformations such as renaming, ordering (e.g., changing order or methods, or changing order of parameters in methods), and aggregations (e.g., inline and outline methods, cloning methods) [26] . In general, the study by Schulze and Meyer showed that obfuscation by renaming identifiers reduces the effectiveness of text-based clone detectors [5] . According to recent research results, 60% of Android apps in the Google Play Store are at least partially obfuscated and at least 20% use more advanced techniques [29] . However, there is little research about how robust certain app clone detection techniques are against code obfuscations.
In this paper, we address the above two issues and find out a robust and accurate technique for detecting cloned Android apps transformed by code obfuscation. We thus devise a new efficient system, called RomaDroid, to detect obfuscated app clones as well as non-obfuscated app clones on Android markets. RomaDroid uses the hierarchical tree structure of each app's manifest file and implicit intents and their component information inside the manifest file to achieve both accuracy and robustness even under circumstances where illegal cloned apps are obfuscated in order to conceal their piracy or reuse. RomaDroid is ''a robust app clone detector based on each app's manifest file in Android''. We implement RomaDroid and verify its effectiveness using 148 original apps and their 620 obfuscated versions generated by the three popular Android obfuscators, ProGuard [30] , DexGuard [31], and DashO [32] . Our approach shows low false positives, false negatives, and low processing overhead. Overall, the main characteristics and contributions of our study are summarized as follows:
• We develop a robust app clone detector and demonstrate its effectiveness in Android. The detector can handle not only non-obfuscated apps but also obfuscated apps.
• Our approach utilizes only simple features in Androidmanifest.xml file in each Android APK package. The features consist of a tree structure of the manifest file and the class name of components associated with each implicit intent in the manifest file which is mostly resilient to obfuscations. On the contrary, most of the previous studies utilize the information in the DEX file in each APK package.
• We achieve high accuracy and scalability in detecting cloned apps based on the longest common subsequence (LCS) algorithm to compare two apps after converting the features in each manifest file into a string sequence.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes code obfuscation and the structure of an Androidmanifest.xml file. Section 3 presents our proposed approach for detecting cloned apps. Section 4 explains experiments and their evaluation. Section 5 contains a discussion of the experimental results and describes some limitations of our approach, and Section 6 gives conclusions.
II. BACKGROUND A. CODE OBFUSCATION
Code obfuscation is a technique that can be used to protect the intellectual property of software against reverse engineering and tampering attacks [27] , [33] - [37] . Obfuscation transforms program code and data of an app into more complex and ambiguous representations but with preserving the original behavior of the app. Even though obfuscation cannot completely prevent mobile apps to be reverse engineered, it can make reverse engineering harder and more time-consuming. Therefore, code obfuscation is a common practice recommended in the Android developer guide to protect security protocols and other application components from reverse engineering attacks. A recent study reported that 24.92% of 1.7 million free Android apps from Google Play were obfuscated by the developer and 50% of the most popular apps (160 apps) with more than 10 million downloads were obfuscated [34] . For improving the health of the overall Android ecosystem, there are several obfuscation tools which range from free, open-source solutions providing only basic obfuscation features like ProGuard, up to premium obfuscation features like DexGuard [34] , [35] and method names are replaced with non-ASCII characters and strings are encrypted.
DashO [32] provides enterprise-grade protection for all Java and Android apps, reducing the risk of intellectual property theft, piracy, and tampering. DashO's services associated with obfuscation include renaming of the names of methods and variables, making source code much harder to understand, encrypting strings in sensitive parts of the target app, and code optimization with pruning, which allows for static analysis of the code to find the unused types, methods, and fields [35] . Table 1 shows the selected features of the three popular obfuscation tools (obfuscators) for the Android environment [34] . Identifier renaming obfuscates package, class, method, and file names by replacing their original values with meaningless labels.
Name-overloading assigns the same name to methods with a different signature (i.e., different list of method argument types) by utilizing the overloading feature of the Java language.
String encryption encrypts strings for deterring simple string searches over the code base and hiding sensitive information about the program flow. Class encryption encrypts classes in a DEX file to avoid detection by decompilers and to increase the difficulty of decompilation. The Java reflection API allows programmers to dynamically inspect and interact with otherwise static language concepts such as classes, methods, and fields, e.g., to create new object instances and invokes a method dynamically. One common normal usage is to invoke nonpublic APIs in the SDK. Reflection is a good technique of hiding program behaviors because it can transfer the control to a certain function implicitly.
Unfortunately, on the other hand, code obfuscation has been also used to hide illegal reuse and avoid licensing issues [27] , [29] , [37] . Therefore, it is necessary to detect correctly repackaged, cloned, plagiarized apps even under the condition where they are transformed by some obfuscation tools. In this paper, we collect randomly many real Android apps from the F-Droid open source app market which are all non-obfuscated apps (also called original apps). We obfuscate the original apps using the three obfuscators (ProGuard, DexGuard, and DashO) and conduct experiments using the original apps and their obfuscated versions in order to evaluate the efficacy of RomaDroid.
B. APP MANIFEST FILE
Every app (including system apps such as the phone or SMS apps) written for the Android platform must have an XML-formatted file name AndroidManifest.xml [38] - [42] . The Android manifest file describes essential information about each app to the Android build tools, the Android operating system, and Google Play. The AndroidManifest.xml file is within each Android app and has the structure shown in Figure 1 . The manifest file is described as XML structure defined by tags, elements or attributes.
The AndroidManifest.xml file is within each Android app and has the structure shown in Figure 1 . The manifest file is described as XML structure defined by tags, elements or attributes. The tag is a markup structure that starts with ''<'' and ends with ''>'' sign. XML makes differences between start-tag and end-tag. End-tag starts with ''</'' and ends with ''>''. The element is a logistical structure that starts with start-tag and ends with end-tag. Attributes is a name and value pair that exists within a start-tag.
An XML document including the manifest file can be modeled as an ordered labeled tree [43] , [44] . Each node in the tree corresponds to an element and can be labeled with the element tag name. Each edge in the tree can represent the inclusion of the element corresponding to the child node under the element corresponding to the parent node in the XML file. In Figure 1 , the left side shows a simple manifest file, and the right side shows its ordered labeled tree. In the figure, each node of the tree is labeled with the tag name in bold type of the corresponding attribute. The root node of degree 3 has three of the first-level subtrees. That is, the <manifest> node is the root node which is the topmost node without a parent. The <permission>, <uses-permission>, and <application> nodes are sibling nodes which share the same parent node <manifest>. The <application> node is the parent node of <activity> node. The <intent-filter> node is the child of <activity> node. The <action> and <category> nodes are a leaf node which has not any child node.
The manifest file conceptually has a hierarchical tree structure. All tags and elements in a manifest file can contain subtags, elements, and attributes. The tree represented by a manifest file starts at the root tag/element and branches to the lowest level of tags/elements. The root tag <manifest> is located at level 1 (first level). The <application>, the <activity>, the <intent-filter>, and the <action> are located at level 2 (2nd level), level 3 (3rd level), level 4 and level 5 respectively. Upper level's tag can be considered as the parent of the tag at its next lower level. Each tag's level can be distinguished by the number of blanks in front of each tag in the manifest file. The level 1 tag begins with one blank (See Figure 3) . There are two, three, four, and six blanks in front of level 2, level 3, level 4, and level 5 tags respectively. Each app's manifest file declares the app's package name, the components of the app, the permissions the app needs, and the hardware and software feature that the app requires [38] . The app's package name usually matches the namespace of the app code. The components include all activities, services, broadcast receivers, and content providers. Each component must define basic properties such as the name of its Kotlin or Java class. A component can declare intent filters that describe how the component can be started. Permissions are declared using the uses-permission tag followed by a common namespace (usually android.permission. * for Google defined permission) [41] . Self-declared permissions which other apps can request are labeled with the permission tag.
The Intent is an abstract description of an operation to be performed [39] , [42] . The Intent is a unidirectional message with an arbitrary action string that can be broadcasted to all apps or sent to a specific app. App activities, services, and broadcast receivers are activated by intents. Sending and VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 2. The process of detection in the proposed approach (RomaDroid).
receiving of intents may require permission [39] . When an app issues an intent to the system, the system locates an app component that can handle the intent based on intent filter declarations in a manifest file. An app component can have any number of intent filters (defined with the <intent-filter> tag). A <intent-filter> tag specifies the types of intents that an activity, service, or broadcast receiver can respond to. An intent filter can list several actions.
In Figure 1 , note that the parent of an <intent-filter> node is a component (i.e., <activity> node) that responds to the <intent-filter>, where the <intent-filter> node and its parent component node is located at level 4 and level 3 respectively. In order to detect cloned apps, we extract several features from each app's manifest file such as the tree structure of tags, intent-filter tags, the parent component names of the intentfilter tags, etc.
III. THE PROPOSED APPROACH
We propose a new effective approach to detect app clones based on a manifest file. We assume cloned apps are repackaged after being obfuscated. In the AndroidManifest.xml with a hierarchical tree structure, the intent-filter tags and the app's component tags associated with them are required to respond to external requests and cannot be obfuscated. We use the tree structure and those intents' parent components as program features. For a single app, we construct a string that represents the tree structure of the manifest file and reflects the intent-filter tags and their parent component tags. We use the longest common subsequence (LCS) [45] algorithm to measure the similarity of two strings. The process of detection is illustrated in Figure 2 .
A. THE REASON FOR EXPLOITING ANDROIDMANIFEST.XML
The manifest file contains some information that cannot be obfuscated because without them an app cannot interact with the Android system and other apps. Of this information, we use the XML tree structure and the class names of the parent components of the <intent-filter> tags as feature information.
Tags in each AndroidManifest.xml has a tree structure consisting of up to five levels. Tags must be specified at a fixed level. Some tags in the manifest file of an app should not be transformed by obfuscation tools at random. Developers can only modify them manually. The <intent-filter> is one of those tags.
The intent is a mechanism used by an app to transfer information to a component of its own or another one. The intent is also used to start another component. There are two kinds of intent: explicit and implicit. An explicit intent can specify its particular recipient by name, whereas an implicit intent just specifies an action to Android. For an implicit intent, Android determines an actual recipient according to the AndroidManifest.xml.
In the AndroidManifest.xml, components can specify the <intent-filter> tag. This intent filter specifies the types of implicit intents that an activity, service, or broadcast receiver can respond to. If a component contains an <intent-filter> tag, that component will be exposed to other apps in the mobile device. That is, the component has a default <exported=''true''> attribute. Also, a component without an intent filter can be exposed to the outside by setting <exported=''true''> explicitly. These exported component classes can be called from other apps at any time. The caller will have both an implicit intent and an explicit intent. Because the Android runtime considers these components' names public APIs and makes them visible to other apps, the names need to be preserved. In this paper, we use the component class information that is exported either explicitly or implicitly. The components that are declared as <exported=''false''> intentionally by the developer are excluded.
B. TREE STRUCTURE OF ANDROIDMANIFEST.XML TAGS
The tags in an AndroidManifest.xml form a tree data structure. AndroidManifest.xml uses a space character before the tag to identify the level of the tags. Lower-level tags are declared at positions spaced more than upper-level tags. We use the following structural characteristics of the XML file;
• The tags of the XML file form a tree structure, and with AndroidManifest.xml the tree level is fixed. The tags are specified in the depth-first search order. 
FIGURE 4.
The example feature information reflecting both tree structure and class names.
• The inclusion relation between a parent and a child node is expressed by declaring a child tag inside a parent tag. In addition, a parent tag is distinguished from a child node by whitespace characters as the example shown in Figure 3 . You can construct a single string from a tree structure, reflecting the number of blanks in front of each tag. Figure 3 shows an example feature string, where '1B' means one blank and '2B' means two blanks, and so on. A tag declared at '2B' means a child node of a tag declared at '1B', and a tag declared at '4B' is a child node of a tag declared at '3B'. Reading the file sequentially from the beginning is equivalent to traversing 1 the tree structure in a depth-first-search order. A feature string, thus, represents a tree structure in this order.
C. INTENT-RELATED INFORMATION
The components that have the <intent-filter> tag and are not declared as <exported=''false''> cannot be obfuscated as mentioned above. We add these components' class names to feature information. The left side of Figure 4 is a partial representation of an AndroidManifest.xml tree. We assume that the first level (the root node) begins with one blank, the third level (component nodes) three blanks, the fourth level (intent-filter nodes) four blanks, the last level (leaf nodes) six blanks, respectively. In the example, nodes A and B represent the Android app components and include intent-filter tags.
If a component node has an intent-filter child and is not declared as <export=''false''>, we add the hash value of the component's class name to its feature string. We use a cryptographic hash function such as SHA-256. Because hash values have the same length regardless of lengths of the class names, we can reduce the influence of different lengths of class names. If a component node does not have an intent-filter child, feature information remains the same.
For the component that has an intent-filter node as a child, its package name is usually obfuscated, but its class name is not obfuscated. Therefore, our feature information is resilient to code obfuscation. the final feature string. The similarity between two strings can be measured by the longest common subsequence (LCS) algorithm.
Given two strings X and Y, the longest common subsequence of X and Y is the longest sequence Z that is a subsequence of both X and Y. For example, let X = (ABRACADABRA) and let Y = (YABBADABBADOO). Then the longest common subsequence Z is (ABADABA). (See Figure 5) That is, the similarity ratio of the two strings is calculated as follows.
|LCS(s1, s2)| / max(|s1|, |s2|) // The denominator is the length of the longer string of s1 and s2.
e.g.) Given s1= ''ABDF'' and s2=''ABDEF'', their similarity ratio = 4/5 = 0.8
In the right side of Figure 4 , two apps differ only the bottom app has one more node on the fourth level. The two feature strings differ by two bytes. We can expect the similarity ratio is high. Figure 6 is the overall process of the experiment to evaluate the performance of RomaDroid. We use ProGuard [30], DexGuard [31], and DashO [32] to create obfuscated app clones from original apps (non-obfuscated ones). Next, we generate a feature string of each app and calculate the similarity ratios between each pair of apps based on the feature string. For the validation of our proposed technique, we followed these definitions and equations.
IV. EVALUATION
• True Positive (TP): For an app A, TP refers to the number of samples correctly classified as A, where an app can be either a non-obfuscated app or an obfuscated app.
• True Negative (TN): For an app non-A, TN refers to the number of samples correctly classified as non-A.
• False Positive (FP): For an app non-A, FP refers to the number of samples incorrectly classified as A.
• False Negative (FN): For an app A, FN refers to the number of samples incorrectly classified as non-A.
If feature information is too generic, false positive will increase. As false positive goes up, accuracy, precision, F1 score, and false positive rate go down.
A. DATASET FOR EVALUATION
To construct the dataset for the experiment, we collected 148 original apps (non-obfuscated apps) from F-Droid, a repository of free and open-source software on the Android platform [46] . Next, we used the three obfuscation tools to generate obfuscated versions of the original apps: ProGuard [30], DexGuard [31], and DashO [32] . We applied two obfuscation options of the tools for each app. For DexGuard, we applied the renaming obfuscation option and string encryption option; for ProGuard the default option and the default with the optimizing option; and for DashO the renaming obfuscation option and control flow modification option, respectively. The proposed approach is mainly influenced by the renaming obfuscation. Since the obfuscators apply each option independently, the result of renaming obfuscation is almost unchanged regardless of how many obfuscation options are applied at the same time. Therefore, we make cloned apps by applying one option at a time. Theoretically, we should have 888 obfuscated app clones (148 apps * 3 tools * 2 options). However, we got 620 clones because sometimes an obfuscator may fail to obfuscate an app [47] . Table 2 summarizes the number of obfuscated apps generated by each obfuscation option. As a result, we used 768 apps for the experiment, consisting of 148 original apps and 620 obfuscated apps. We compare the similarity of (an origi- nal app, an obfuscated app) pairs, that is, 148x620 pairs in our experiments. Figure 7 shows the detection performance of the RomaDroid and SimiDroid in terms of the similarity threshold. When the similarity ratio exceeds the threshold value, we decide two apps are the same. In order to determine an appropriate similarity threshold value, we carry out experiments using 14 orginal apps and 62 obfuscated apps randomly selected from the data set in Table 2 . The results are shown in Figure 7 . In case of RomaDroid, you see the overall detection performance improves with the threshold increasing up to 90%. However, when the threshold is 99%, the F1 score decreases significantly. With 99% threshold, small changes in feature information make us judge two apps are different and thus more false negatives are generated than the case the threshold is 90%. We set the similarity threshold of RomaDroid to 90% in the experiments from Section 4.C to Section 4.G.
B. PERFORMANCE IN TERMS OF THE SIMILARITY THRESHOLD
In case of SimiDroid, on the other hand, the lower threshold considered, the slightly higher the accuracy and F1 score achieved (see Figure 7) . The objective of SimiDroid is to identify and explain similarities/changes among app versions and among repackaged apps [22] , [56] . To calculate a similarity score of the given two apps (app 1 , app 2 ), SimiDroid adopts four similarity metrics: identical methods, similar methods, new methods, and deleted methods between the two compared apps. SimiDroid computes the similarity score using a formula based on the four metrics. See [22] , [56] for more details. In Figure 7 , we see that the performance of SimiDroid is hardly affected by a pre-defined threshold. The reason seems VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 8. The number of components with intent-filters of the apps in our dataset and the top 50 apps in Google Play Store. to be because of the four metrics-based formula. We set the similarity threshold to 50% for the performance measurement of SimiDroid in Section 4.F. Li et al. considered 80% as the threshold in their studies [22] , [56] .
C. PERFORMANCE CONSIDERING MAIN ACTIVITY COMPONENT
We can include or exclude the main activity component information to a feature string. The main activity component runs first when an app launches. For obfuscated apps, the main activity component is usually named as ''.MainActivity''. The effect of the inclusion depends on the number of components with intent-filter tags. The inclusion does not affect the detection performance when apps have many components with intent-filters. However, if the number of components with intent-filters is very small, the inclusion may incur false positives. Table 3 shows these results. For our dataset, the RomaDroid also performs better when the main activity is excluded. We present the results excluding the main activity component from now on.
D. PERFORMANCE DEPENDING ON THE OBFUSCATION TOOLS
We have experimented with the dataset to find out how the performance varies depending on the obfuscation tools. Table 4 shows the results of detecting apps obfuscated by the three tools. #Apps column displays the total number of apps obfuscated by each obfuscation tool. DashO might sometimes transform even the component name with intent-filter and the probability of false negatives is higher than the cases of the other two tools. For apps obfuscated by ProGuard and DexGuard, false negatives can occur when the size of an app is very small and the main activity only have intent-filters. The feature information consists of a tree structure only and is very short. In addition, this structure might be transformed during obfuscation or decompilation. As a result, two apps are mistakenly considered to be different.
False positive rate is the highest for apps obfuscated by ProGuard and this is closely related to the number of components in an app. For ProGuard, the proportion of apps with fewer than two components was higher than DexGuard or DashO. The smaller the number of components, the shorter the length of feature information. When a feature information string is short, the false positive rate increases if two component names are the same by chance. Next, we explore how the number of components having intent-filters affects detection performance.
E. PERFORMANCE DEPENDING ON THE NUMBER OF COMPONENTS HAVING INTENT-FILTERS
The performance of detection depending on the number of components with intent-filters as well as without <exported=''false''> attribute are shown in Table 5 . We mentioned that the number of original apps is 148, the number of obfuscated apps is 620, and the main activity information is not included in the feature information. ''No. of Components'' column represents the number of components with intent-filters. Of the 620 obfuscated apps, 92 apps have no component with intent-filters, 291 apps one component, 99 apps two components, 60 apps three components, 26 apps four components, and 52 apps more than four components, respectively. For each row, we compared 148 * #Apps pairs and calculated an average. For example, 148×620 pairs were compared in row 1 and 148 × 528 in row 2, respectively. The more the number of components with intent-filters, the higher the F1 Score.
The recall is lower than any other cases when apps have two or three components with intent-filters. The recall decreases as false negative increases. In our dataset, false negative occurs for an app obfuscated by DashO. This misjudgment is due to change of class names of components with intent-filters and happens for apps with equal to or fewer than three components. For the first two rows, the number of apps that are misjudged remains the same, but the total sample apps increase F. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON WITH SIMIDROID Table 6 compares the detection performance to SimiDroid, a recent existing study of detecting Android app clones [22] . We measured the performance of SimiDroid using the same dataset.
We chose the threshold that showed the best performance for the dataset. For SimiDroid, we measured the performance with thresholds set to 40%, 50%, and 60%. SimiDroid has three plug-ins, and each plug-in extracts the different types of feature information from an app: Method Plug-in, Component Plug-in, and Resource Plug-in. We used the Component Plug-in because it extracts feature information similar to RomaDroid. Component Plug-in uses the component name and the type of the component as feature information. While RomaDroid only extracts the class name, SimiDroid extracts all the strings including the package name. RomaDroid performs better than SimiDroid in general. For the precision value, SimiDroid performs better because SimiDroid rarely incurs false positive. SimiDroid uses no feature other than the name of the component while RomaDroid uses the tree structure of the manifest file. For apps with smaller components, the effect of the tree structure becomes significant and false positive increases. SimiDroid, on the other hand, is relatively not resilient to app obfuscation because it extracts all component names and performs the comparison. Therefore, false negative increases in SimiDroid and it exhibits lower recall. Table 7 presents the experimental results that compare (1) two apps in the original apps; (2) one in the original apps and one in the obfuscated apps; and (3) two apps in obfuscated apps, respectively. In the table, ''Original'' and ''Obfusca'' denote original and obfuscated apps, respectively. The #Apps column shows the total number of pairs of 148 × 148, 148 × 620, and 620 × 620 pairs, respectively. In terms of F1 score, the result with two original apps is 95.48; the result with original apps and obfuscated apps 94.50; and the result with two obfuscated apps 92.11, respectively. F1 score is best when we compare two original apps.
G. VALIDATION OF RESILIENCE TO OBFUSCATION
As shown in Table 5 , RomaDroid performs better for applications which have many components with intent filters. The apps that degrade the performance have something in common: They have fewer than three components with intent filters. The obfuscated apps are created using 148 original apps, so they have the same number of components as the original apps and more performance degrading apps. As a result, experiments with obfuscated apps show relatively low performance. We can see that RomaDroid performs well for obfuscated apps as well as un-obfuscated apps (original apps).
V. DISCUSSION
We have shown that our approach can effectively detect apps that are cloned for malicious purpose. We, however, see some performance degradation when an app has two or three components with intent-filter, so need to check its effectiveness for real-world apps. Figure 8 shows the number of components with intent-filters of the 50 most downloaded apps in the Google Play Store for December 2018. The number of apps with more than 12 components was 39 and the average number of components was 45. Especially, the Samsung_Health_v6.0.0.085_apkpure.com.apk app has 303 components. We can expect the RomaDroid will perform well for most apps on the app markets because apps with more components have longer feature strings. Most apps at the store have more than three components with intent-filters and we expect our scheme detects as good as the experiments.
In contrast to the other studies that used one obfuscation tool for experiments, we use three obfuscation tools that are used most frequently. This helps to better understand the behavior of each obfuscation tool.
RomaDroid extracts feature string for a specific app when the app is installed on a mobile device. This extraction uses only information in AndroidManifest.xml. Because AndroidManifest.xml is very small compared to the size of the app, extraction time overhead and the size of the feature string are small. Therefore, we can store all feature strings of installed apps on the device. Each feature information is stored in the form of the tuple (the name of the app, feature string). RomaDroid receives the feature string of the about-to-install app as input and searches the similar apps in the tuple database. If the similar apps are found, RomaDroid returns the names of the apps.
A. LIMITATION
The proposed RomaDroid detects code obfuscated app clones. To perform the validation and performance of RomaDroid, we collected 148 apps (non-obfuscated apps) from F-Droid, a repository of free and open source software on the Android platform [46] . Next, we used the three obfuscation tools to generate obfuscated clones: ProGuard [30], DexGuard [31], and DashO [32] . We did not use apps from app markets because it is difficult to collect enough obfuscated apps for experimentation and to determine what obfuscation method is applied.
Our technique does not deal with third-party libraries for app clone detection. RomaDroid cannot detect illegal use of parts of an app because it uses only AndroidManifest.xml for feature information. AndroidManifest describes overall information of an app without detail information for each component. RomaDroid cannot detect specific classes (functions), the vulnerable 3rd party library, and the Open Source Software module that violates copyright.
RomaDroid is usually fast and performs well, but if an app has less than three components that have an intent-filter, then the false negative ratio will increase. This is because DashO often obfuscates the class name of a component with an intent-filter. Another reason is that the manifest file is not completely restored when reverse engineering the APK. For apps developed by the same developer, or for apps with similar functionality, the class name of a component with an intent-filter can coincide with each other. The smaller the size of the app and the more similar the functionality, the more likely it will happen that the structure of the manifest file and the component class name with the intent-filter are the same. These increase the false positive ratio.
VI. RELATED WORK
Repackaged and cloned apps have been found in official app stores as well as many third-party markets, which compromise the copyright of original authors as well as pose threats to privacy and security of mobile users. These actions cause the original app authors to lose potential revenues. Therefore, several approaches have been presented for detecting repackage and cloned apps, and explaining their strengths and weaknesses.
String-based technique [10] has been proposed for detecting code clones. The string-based technique divides a program into strings (typically lines), and these strings are compared against each other to find sequences of duplicated strings. A string-based approach does not exploit any lexical information, so it is impossible to handle simple transformations such as identifier renaming. The string in the literature [10] is different from the string in this paper which reflects a tree structure of each manifest file and the component names with implicit intent(s).
Token-based approaches [11] , [12] convert source code into a stream of ''tokens'' using compiler-style lexical analysis and then compare the streams between two programs. By converting programs into a stream of tokens and ignoring easily changed constructs such as comments, whitespace, and variable names, token-based systems can detect effectively plagiarism including copy-pasted code only if source coded is available as well as code obfuscation is not applied. Unfortunately, the DEX byte code streams contain no higher level semantic knowledge about the code, making these approaches vulnerable to code modifications [18] . Besides, the concrete realization of this token-based technique may be an important aspect for the degree of robustness [5] . Especially, the way how JPLAG (source code-level clone detection tool) transforms a loop into tokens is related to the robustness against loop transformation.
Abstract syntax tree (AST)-based approaches [13] - [15] have also been proposed, in which pattern matching is performed on the parse-tree of the code to search for similar subtrees. In the case of copy-pasted code, using parse trees may introduce false positives because two segments with identical syntax trees are not necessarily copy-pasted. This is why copy-pasted segments reuse a piece of code rather than an abstract syntax structure. The AST-based technique is robust against identifier renaming if the source code is available. However, the AST-based technique is generally expensive since it requires full syntax analysis and transformation. The construction and loop obfuscations may have a considerable effect on the clone detection result [5] . Furthermore, the effect of renaming with separation indicates, that this technique may not be robust against more sophisticated obfuscations such as reordering or adding statements.
JuxtApp is used to detect the similarity of source files using features hashing applications based on k-grams of opcode sequences [16] . It compares apps based on sets of features generated from k-grams of the opcodes inside the disassembled app's methods. DroidMOSS [17] detected the similarity on the base of fuzzy hashing, which identify the repackaged applications after decompilation. DroidMOSS computes a series of fingerprints for each app based on the fuzzy hashes of consecutive opcodes, ignoring operands. Apps are then compared pairwise for repackaging by calculating the edit distance between the overall fingerprint of each app. A white list is used for library filtering. These approaches based on a hashing scheme or code orders are vulnerable to plagiarism that involves code restructuring and moderate amounts of modifying statements.
A Program Dependence Graph (PDF) represents dependencies among statements and predicates in a program, where each node is a statement and each edge shows a dependency between statements. PDG-based approaches [1] , [2] , [18] , [19] capture the control flow or data dependencies between the code statements inside code fragments. For example, DNADroid [18] is a tool which detects Android app cloning based on the ''semantic information'' of disassembled code. It compares PDGs between methods in candidate apps by using subgraph isomorphism algorithms. DNADroid could detect two variants of the same malware and have a very low false positive rate. It may overlook cloned apps due to a false negative. Some program obfuscations can evade PDG-based clone detection, which is a fundamental limitation of DNADroid. The features used in AnDarwin [1] , [2] , [19] represent the functionality of methods of an app and are thus difficult to change. If the copied code segments behave the same as their original counterparts, they should have the same dependencies between the input and output elements. Thus, PDG-based approaches are more robust than token and AST-based approaches and can analyze apps at Java byte code level. However, PDG comparison by graph isomorphism analysis is computationally expensive and not scalable, which cannot handle billions of opcodes in multiple markets. In addition, semantics block level clustering used in [19] would introduce a high false positive rate [7] .
Schulze and Meyer [5] proposed a source-code level framework for semi-automated code obfuscations and showed a case study to evaluate the robustness of selected clone detectors against such obfuscations. They explained the difference and compared the characteristics of the four most common clone detection techniques: text-based, token-based, AST-based and PDG-based techniques. They considered the effects of code obfuscation at source code level not executable code level. Our technique focuses on detecting cloned apps at the executable code level.
Chen et al. [7] use the geometry characteristic (centroid) of dependency graphs to calculate the similarity between the methods of two apps. Their solution has demonstrated to be both scalable and accurate. However, it has two drawbacks. First, the detection depends on the sorting order, e.g., if we filter a library by the instruction count, we possible miss methods that are very similar to the invocation count. Second, they also use a whitelist to filter third-party libraries, which could lead to inaccurate results. Wang et al. [20] leveraged counting-based code clone detection techniques, which can improve the accuracy of token-based clone detection and are effective in some cases such as identifying programming bugs and plagiarisms. However, these techniques also face scalability difficulties because of their complexity. Kim et al. [21] proposed a symbolic-based approach to identify semantically equivalent procedures. However, these approaches are generally slower and not scalable enough [3] .
Wang et al. devised a technique called WuKong [3] to detect app clones on Android markets. They employ a two-phase detection technique; a coarse-grained detection phase to identify suspicious apps by comparing light-weight static semantic features, and a fine-grained phase to compare more detailed features for only those apps found in the first phase. For further improving the detection speed and accuracy, WuKong introduced an automated clusteringbased preprocessing step to filter third-party libraries before carrying out app clone detection. In order to filter third-party libraries in the pre-processing step, API calls were used as features, which cannot be modified during name obfuscation. For verifying the effectiveness of WuKong, Wang et al. generated the app clone pairs using ProGuard to obfuscate the apps. They cannot deal with the case that hackers use some complex obfuscation algorithms such as Class Encrypter [23] Huang et al. and API obfuscation to evade WuKong. They did not attempt to measure the false negative because there is no feasible way to find the ground truth for their dataset. They also mentioned that most of the previous app clone detection approaches have not measured the false negative rate.
Li et al. proposed SimiDroid [22] that is a plugin-based framework for multi-level comparison of Android apps and can support the understanding of similarities/changes among VOLUME 7, 2019 app versions and among repackaged apps. They devised several similarity comparison methods as plugins for SimiDroid. Those methods have been borrowed from descriptions in the state-of-the-art literature, covering code-based similarity comparison at the statement level or at the component level, and resource-based similarity comparison. Since SimiDroid's objective is providing to the community an extensible framework for supporting the comprehension of similarities among Android apps, we have compared our RomaDroid with the component plugin (CPlugin) of SimiDroid which is the closest to our approach of three plugins. CPlugin, component-based comparison, extracts app features at the component level, where key/value mappings are inferred from component names, and other Android package information. CPlugin does not consider a tree structure of each app's manifest file, while RomaDroid uses the names of the components with intent-filter tag(s) and a hierarchical tree structure of each manifest file. Our approach does not utilize the package names in an APK file and other component types except for the components related to an implicit intent.
Recently, Glanz et al. [29] proposed a two-step approach for detecting repackaged apps that consists of a library detection technique LibDetect and an app matcher CodeMatch. The first step identifies and removes the library code in obfuscated apps using LibDetect. It relies on code representations which abstract over several parts of the underlying bytecode to be resilient against certain obfuscation techniques. After the first step, they then fuzzy hash the most abstract representation of the remaining app code to ensure to identify repackaged apps using CodeMatch. To validate the robustness of their approach, they extracted roughly 200 sample library APKs, obfuscated the APKs with DexGuard, and tried to reidentify the original library methods. Their approach extracts the feature information from a DEX file with bytecode, not a manifest file.
VII. CONCLUSION
We present a robust and accurate technique for detecting cloned Android apps transformed by code obfuscation. Reverse engineering of Android apps is relatively easier than other mobile platforms and many reverse-engineering tools are available. Android apps are easy to be cracked, reused and replicated.
The proposed method generates feature information of an app by analyzing the AndroidManifest.xml. We use the structure of the manifest file and the obfuscation invariant information in it as feature information. We, then, compare the similarity between two apps using the Longest Common Subsequence algorithm.
To verify the validity of the proposed method, we used the collected apps and obfuscated them using ProGuard [30], DexGuard [31] , and DashO [32] , and measured the detection accuracy and performance of the dataset. A total of 768 apps were constructed, and five indicators were used to measure the performance of RomaDroid. Experimental results showed about 99% accuracy.
The proposed technique has the advantage that it does not require source code to detect app clones. Most apps do not provide their source code, so clone detection techniques using source codes is limited. But our approach takes advantage of the information in the executable deployed, so it can be used for almost any app.
In particular, the feature information is generated by analyzing only the AndroidManifest.xml file. Therefore, it is another advantage that the feature information generation time is very fast. Other feature information requires a long time to analyze an app and create feature information.
Also, since the feature information is generated by analyzing only the structure of AndroidManifest.xml file and the components having the intent filter, the length of feature information is short. This means that it takes less time to compare the two apps.
The proposed technique is useful for detecting redistributed apps after a deployed Android app has been modified for malicious purposes. To hide the redistribution of these apps, apps are obfuscated, so it is difficult to detect duplication and redistribution. We expect that our approach can detect malware and open source code with modification. 
